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Abstract. We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game,
whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of
the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a
player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value, and second,
new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These
coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new and deletion of
existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence
of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of
deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is
qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion
of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of
a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite of the sustained random
topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of
defection temptation values.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb
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1. Introduction
Social dilemmas emerge if actions warranting individual success harm collective
wellbeing [1]. While cooperative behavior is universally regarded as the rational strategy
leading away from the impending social decline, its evolution in groups of selfish
individuals is puzzling [2]. Evolutionary game theory is frequently used as the framework
within which answers to the puzzle are sought [3], and the prisoner’s dilemma game
seems particularly suited in this respect. In this game mutual cooperation yields the
highest collective payoff that is equally shared between the players. However, defectors
will do better as individuals if their opponents cooperate. In well mixed populations
selfishness always leads to mutual defection [4], whereby players remain empty-handed
and the society suffers. The pivotal study that launched a spree of activity aimed
towards resolving the dilemma is due to Nowak and May [5], who showed that spatial
structure may maintain cooperative behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Further
mechanisms promoting cooperation are kin selection [6], direct and indirect reciprocity
[7, 8], as well as group [9, 10, 11] and multilevel selection [12, 13], as recently reviewed
in [14]. Related specifically to the present work is the promotion of cooperation via
multilevel selection, which can be related to group selection [15], although the latter
term is frequently addressed in a rather problematic fashion (see [16] for a recent recap).
Particularly vibrant in recent years has been the subject of evolutionary games on
complex networks [17, 18]. High cooperation levels reported on scale-free networks
highlighted the beneficial impact of heterogeneity that characterizes their degree
distribution [19]. Notably, the promotive impact of heterogeneous states on the evolution
of cooperation has been reported also in other contexts [26, 27]. Although several studies
have since elaborated on different aspects of strategy adoption on complex networks
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31], open questions remain. Foremost, it is still of
interest to investigate how the coevolution of networks affects the evolution of strategies.
Following the earlier works in the context of evolutionary game theory [32, 33, 34], it
has recently been shown that highly heterogeneous interaction networks may evolve
spontaneously from simple coevolutionary rules [35, 36, 37, 38, 39], and moreover,
processes like appropriate reactions to adverse ties [40, 41], reputation-based partner
choice [42], as well as increase of teaching activity [43, 44], have all been considered as
coevolutionary rules that can promote cooperative behavior. This subject is intimately
connected with the seminal works on network growth [45, 46] and their resilience to
error and attack [47, 48, 49, 50] as means to alter the topology in order to affect the
spread of epidemics and viral infections [51, 52, 53] in an efficient way [54], as recently
argued in [55]. Moreover, the evolution on networks is increasingly often accompanied
also by the evolution of networks not just in the context of evolutionary games [56, 57],
but indeed networks are to be seen as evolving entities that may substantially influence
all dynamical processes that are taking place on them [58, 59].
Aim of the present work is to show that coevolutionary rules molding the interaction
network can influence the evolution of cooperation not via the emergence of strong
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degree heterogeneity, as reported earlier [37, 38, 39], but may indeed introduce processes
that affect the macroscopic dynamics of strategy adoption. We introduce a simple
strategy-independent coevolutionary rule that qualitatively preserves the Poissonian
degree distribution of the initial random interaction network. The coevolutionary rule
involves the deletion of existing links upon the adoption of a new strategy or exceeding
of a given maximal degree, and the addition of new links after every τ full Monte Carlo
steps. These coevolutionary additions and deletions of links are motivated by the fact
that, especially in human but also in animal societies, ties between members of the
population change in time. In particular, the formation of links is common – e.g. we
socialize, we make friends – thus, in the course of a lifetime we certainly form many new
ties with others. We take this into account in our model by adding randomly a new
link to each player every τ full Monte Carlo steps. Note that since we add new links
every τ game iterations, the number of links an individual accumulates over time can
be directly linked with age. This is why extinction (death) of players is considered by
deleting existing links whenever the degree of a player exceeds a threshold value. And
finally, there are situations in life when an individual changes a significant part of its
existence. Within our model we consider this to be the player’s strategy, while in reality
examples that can be considered as related are changing the lifestyle, moral values or
political orientation, all of which typically lead to restructuring of one’s connections
with others. In accordance, we therefore delete existing links of the player that changes
its strategy. From a biological viewpoint, the latter act can be linked with an invasion
of the subordinate species and the subsequent replacement by a newborn of the victor.
The proposed coevolutionary rule thus generically describes the formation and
deletion of links with other members of the society in a general and strategy-independent
(the same rules apply for cooperators and defectors) manner. Jointly, the two processes
of link addition and deletion annihilate each other’s fingerprint on the heterogeneity
of the degree distribution, thereby eliminating network structure as a potentially
decisive factor by the evolution of cooperation. Remarkably though, we demonstrate
that the coevolutionary rule spontaneously evokes a dynamical mechanism that can
be interpreted as a multilevel selection (see e.g. [12]) in that, on the macroscopic
level, groups of cooperators have much better chances of dissemination than groups of
defectors, whereas on the microscopic level, defectors within a given group are superior
to cooperators. The spontaneous emergence of multilevel selection within the proposed
coevolutionary model leads to complete dominance of cooperators across the whole span
of the temptation to defect provided τ is large enough. The study thus supplements
previous works examining the impact of different coevolutionary rules, and moreover,
demonstrates that heterogeneity can be of secondary importance by the evolution of
cooperation on complex networks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe
the employed evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game and the protocol for the coevolution
of the random network. Section 3 is devoted to the presentation of the main findings,
whereas in the last section we summarize conclusions based on them.
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Table 1. Payoff matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Strategies in rows get the
depicted payoff when playing the game with the strategies in columns.
C D
C 1 0
D b 0
2. Mathematical model
Here the prisoner’s dilemma game is used as a representative example of a social
dilemma, whereby we adopt the same parametrization as proposed in [5]. Accordingly,
the game is characterized by the temptation to defect T = b, reward for mutual
cooperation R = 1, and punishment P as well as the suckers payoff S equaling 0,
whereby 1 < b ≤ 2. In the game two cooperators facing one another acquire R, two
defectors get P , whereas a cooperator receives S if facing a defector who then gains
T . This can be summarized succinctly by the corresponding payoff matrix given in
Table 1. It is worth noting that the prisoner’s dilemma we use is not strict in that P
is not strictly larger than S, but the qualitative dynamics of the game is thereby not
affected. Initially, each player x is designated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or defector
(sx = D) with equal probability, and is placed on a random network that is constructed
from N individuals so that the average and minimal degree are kavg = 4 and kmin = 1
(no player is detached), respectively. Duplicate links are also omitted. Evolution of the
two strategies is performed in accordance with the Monte Carlo simulation procedure
comprising the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x acquires
its payoff px by playing the game with all its kx neighbors. Next, one randomly chosen
neighbor of x, denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py by playing the game with all its
ky neighbors. Last, if px > py player x tries to enforce its strategy sx on player y in
accordance with the probability W (sx → sy) = (px − py)/bkq, where kq is the largest of
the two degrees kx and ky. This proportional imitation rule [60] is used frequently when
players on heterogeneous networks have different degrees [19, 23, 24, 61]. Notably, an
alternative to the latter is the Fermi strategy adoption rule [62], which enables tuning of
the selection intensity via a single parameter K towards the weak selection limit [63, 64].
However, caution should be exercised when applying it on heterogeneous networks since
due to the different degrees of participating players the temperature K, and thus also
the selection intensity, effectively varies from one strategy adoption to the other. We
therefore use the simplified strategy adoption rule based on proportional imitation, but
note that similar results as will be reported below are expected also for reasonably weak
selection. However, if the strategy adoption process becomes comparable to the flip of
a coin the below reported multilevel selection may be impaired. In accordance with
the applied Monte Carlo procedure incorporating the random sequential update, each
player is selected once on average during a full simulation step (MCS).
In addition to the evolution of the two strategies, a coevolutionary rule is
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a b c d
Figure 1. The central green player in panel (a) passes strategy to the red player that
is connected dashed. In accordance with the proposed coevolutionary rule, in panel (b)
the invaded player (now green) looses all its links, keeping only the one with the donor
of the new strategy. Panels (c) and (d) depict the same process again for a different
pair, whereby it is important to note that the dashed links may be a consequence of the
random additions entailed in the model, occurring every τ full Monte Carlo steps. We
will indeed show that the coevolutionary rule leads to the isolation of cooperating and
defecting groups of players [as depicted in panels (a) and (c) if not taking into account
the dashed links], and that the appropriately tuned frequency of adding new links
(determined by τ) triggers multilevel selection based on which groups of cooperators
(green) prevail against groups of defector (red). The complete sequence of panels
from (a) to (d) depicts this process schematically, and we will refer back to it when
presenting the results.
implemented as follows. Whenever player x adopts a new strategy all its links, except
from the one with the donor of the new strategy, are deleted. Hence, in addition to
adopting a new strategy, the player is separated from its former allies and gets kx = 1.
This process of strategy adoption and simultaneous link deletion is demonstrated in
Fig. 1, and can be motivated by the fact that changes in lifestyle, moral values, political
orientation or religious beliefs frequently result in deletion of existing ties we have formed
with others. To counteract the depletion of links that constitute the random network,
all individuals are allowed to form a new link with a random player with which they
are not yet connected. The latter process, happening after every τ full Monte Carlo
steps, corresponds to the continuous process of socialization or making of new friends,
which typically entails the formation of new links. We also take into account aging, and
accordingly, as soon as kx reaches a threshold kmax, player x dies and is replaced by
a newborn having the same strategy and keeping a single randomly selected link from
its predecessor to assure connectedness. Note that since new links are added every τ
game iterations, the number of links a player accumulates over time can be directly
linked with age. Within the current work kmax does not play a decisive role and was
simply chosen large enough so as not to influence the initial random network topology
and the subsequent evolution of cooperation. The presented results were obtained on
networks hosting N = 104 players, for which kmax = 500 has proven to be sufficiently
large. Importantly, due to the continuous additions and deletions of links the initial
Poissonian outlay of the degree distribution is qualitatively preserved irrespective of b
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Figure 2. Degree distributions of interaction networks for different values of b and τ .
The main panel features results obtained at τ = 70 for b = 1.6 (filled green squares)
and b = 2.7 (open blue circles). Open red squares depict the initial degree distribution
of the random interaction network (the same in the inset). Although the Poissonian
outlay is preserved, the interaction network may warrant full cooperator (b = 1.6;
filled green squares) or full defector (b = 2.7; open blue circles) dominance (see also
Fig. 3 below), thus rendering the heterogeneity of the interaction network irrelevant for
understanding the outcome of the main evolutionary process. The inset demonstrates
the qualitative prevalence of the Poissonian degree distribution in dependence on τ
(30 – filled green squares; 70 – open blue circles; 500 – filled black circles) at b = 2.
The employed system size was N = 104 and the values of P (k) were obtained as
averages over 100 independent realizations.
and τ , as shown in Fig. 2. It is intriguing that, although the coevolutionary rule does not
affect the heterogeneity of the interaction network in a significant manner, the promotion
of cooperation depends crucially on τ , as can be inferred from the caption of Fig. 2.
These motivational results presented in Fig 2 will be explained in the next section. It is
also worth mentioning that the process illustrated in Fig. 1 may occasionally result in
detached players that originally formed the neighborhood of the invaded player, as shown
in Fig. 1(d). In this case we relinked the detached player randomly onto the network.
Next, we will systematically analyze the evolution of cooperation in dependence on b
and τ , which are the two crucial parameters within the proposed coevolutionary model.
Notably, the evolution of cooperation on static random networks has been studied in
[65], and the reader is refereed there for comparisons with respect to the above proposed
coevolutionary model.
3. Results
Within the coevolutionary model the final outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma game is
always an absorbing C or D state. We note that this is an inherent property of the
coevolutionary model that prevails irrespective of the system size N . In order to account
for the resulting fluctuating output near sharp transition points, we depict in Fig. 3 not
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Figure 3. ψC in dependence on b for τ = 1 (open red squares), τ = 10 (filled green
squares) and τ = 70 (open blue circles). Cooperation is promoted substantially as
τ increases, resulting in full dominance of cooperators up to b = 2.2 (beyond the
prisoner’s dilemma range) at τ = 70. Note that for each τ the fixation probability
of cooperators is always one before it breaks down (see also main text for details).
The employed system size was N = 104, and the absorbing state was reached within
2 · 102 − 5 · 104 full Monte Carlo steps depending on b and τ . Final values of ψC were
obtained as averages over 103 independent realizations. Lines are just to guide the eye.
the density of cooperators ρC , but rather the probability ψC that the final state is ρC = 1,
whereby the latter is determined within 1000 independent runs for each particular
combination of b and τ . Foremost, Fig. 3 depicts the effect of different values of τ on
the evolution of cooperation. Clearly, the coevolutionary process promotes cooperation
extremely effectively, resulting in full dominance of cooperators up to b = 1.1 at τ = 1,
b = 1.6 at τ = 10 and up to b = 2.2 at τ = 70, where the latter value of the temptation
to defect is already past the span of the prisoner’s dilemma game as it is considered here.
Given that the continuous deletions and additions of links, entailed in the coevolutionary
process, qualitatively preserve the initial random topology and the heterogeneity of
the interaction networks (see Fig. 2), the observed promotion of cooperation cannot
be attributed to mechanisms that rely on heterogeneous environments reported earlier
[19, 26]. Thus, instead we have to look for additional clues that may explain the doom
of defectors by large values of τ , as evidenced in Fig. 3.
Striving towards a mechanism that could explain the promotion of cooperation,
we show in Fig. 4 temporal courses of ρC at b = 1.5 for increasing values of τ from
left to right. First, it is worth noticing that indeed the absorbing cooperative state is
reached fairly quickly, i.e. within a few thousand full Monte Carlo steps. But most
importantly in Fig. 4, we point out the emergence of time intervals during which ρC
is constant. This cascade-like feature becomes increasingly pronounced as τ increases.
Namely, at τ = 30 (dash-dotted black line) it is practically absent, whereas at τ = 500
(solid red line) the cumulative duration of dormancy of ρC surpasses that of active
phases. We argue that the reason for the emergence of these inactive windows lies
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Figure 4. Temporal evolution of ρC at b = 1.5 for τ = 30 (dash-dotted black line),
τ = 100 (dotted blue line), τ = 200 (dashed green line) and τ = 500 (solid red line).
Steps in the temporal evolution (time intervals during which ρC is constant), which
can be observed by larger values of τ , indicate the emergence of multilevel selection
in the examined model. For easier comparisons of the duration of dormant phases the
inset features the time axes scaled with τ pertaining to each of the depicted curves
(note that τ = 30 is not shown for clarity). Larger values of τ clearly evoke longer
time intervals during which ρC is constant. The employed system size was N = 10
4.
in the newly introduced coevolutionary process, which dictates continuous deletion of
links that occurs always when a player adopts a new strategy, and also if its degree
reaches kmax. If τ is sufficiently large, meaning that new links are added rarely, the
deletions of links lead to the emergence of homogeneous and virtually isolated groups
of players [as schematically depicted in Fig. 1(a) and 1(c) not taking into account the
dashed links]. These groups remain inactive for as long as it takes for the newly added
links [dashed link in Fig. 1(a) and 1(c)] to reconnect them with one another, of which
duration is roughly equivalent to τ (see the inset of Fig. 4). It is important to note
that during the inactive phase there are practically no strategy transfers taking place,
and thus the main source of link deletions is disabled. Consequently, the addition of
new links can gradually reconnect the detached groups, which then again triggers an
avalanche of strategy adoptions [see Figs. 1(b) and 1(d)], which in turn starts the whole
process anew, until eventually an absorbing state is reached. Thus, the temporal plots
in Fig. 4 arguably evidence the spontaneous emergence of multilevel selection, similarly
as proposed recently in [12], due to the introduction of the proposed coevolutionary
rule. We emphasize that the groups are not introduced a priori but eventually emerge
spontaneously for appropriate values of τ . During the dormant phases isolated groups
of cooperators can enhance their strength, while groups of defectors weaken as there is
nobody to exploit. Notably, from the viewpoint of vulnerability there is no difference
between defectors having a small or large degree. Thus, as soon as the two types of
groups reestablish a sufficiently strong interconnectedness, cooperators can successfully
invade the defectors, thereby gradually increasing the cooperative domains. This is
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Figure 5. Critical bc, bordering D phase, in dependence on τ . The best promotion
of cooperation is warranted approximately at τ = 70. The employed system size
was N = 104 and the values of bc were obtained as averages over 10
3 independent
realizations. Line is just to guide the eye.
schematically depicted in Fig. 1 if considering the cooperators to be green and defectors
to be red. The latter processes manifest as rather steep jumps in the temporal traces
of ρC by large enough τ , which are then again followed by dormancy since the many
strategy adoptions anew lead to isolation of homogeneous groups of players. At small
values of τ (dash-dotted black line in Fig. 4), however, these steps are absent, which
indicates that the addition of new links is too fast for the homogeneous groups to become
isolated enough to trigger the multilevel selection. Importantly, a thorough isolation is
necessary (compare the curves in the inset of Fig. 4), since without it groups hosting
both strategies are susceptible to an overrule by defectors. Namely, in the small τ
region the fast additions and deletions of links yield mean-field type conditions that are
arguably harmful for cooperators.
The above interpretation can be corroborated nicely by results presented in Fig. 5,
where the critical temptation to defect bc is plotted in dependence on τ . We determined
bc as the lowest value of b where an absorbing D state is attained with probability one.
It can be observed that, as argued above, by small values of τ , where multilevel selection
cannot be fully established, the promotion of cooperation is indeed marginal. However,
it improves steeply and reaches a maximum at approximately τ = 70. According to
the temporal outlays presented in Fig. 4, this is roughly the value of τ where the
multilevel selection becomes fully pronounced. In particular, note that the steps by
τ = 100, and even by τ = 30, are practically just as frequent as by τ = 500. Crucially,
however, the dormant phases are shorter by smaller τ . Thus, as τ increases past the
optimal value, solely the dormant phases are prolonged, yet the multilevel selection
remains equally intense. Therefore, by values of τ past the optimum the defectors have
more time to overtake individual groups during the dormant phases. Note that the
isolation of homogeneous groups from the opposite strategy is never complete since
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neither individual players nor groups can become fully detached from the network.
The prolongation of dormant states thus results in a slight decrease and subsequent
saturation of bc. Nevertheless, due to the remaining intact multilevel selection even at
large τ , the promotion of cooperation is still significant, letting the critical temptation to
defect hoover comfortably over the maximal b permissible within the prisoner’s dilemma
game.
4. Summary
In sum, we have elaborated on the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game on evolving random networks. Foremost, we have shown that a simple
coevolutionary rule, qualitatively preserving the initial heterogeneity of the interaction
network, may spontaneously evoke a powerful multilevel selection mechanism that
promotes cooperation across the whole span of values of temptation. The extend of the
promotive effect depends on a single parameter τ , determining the frequency of forming
new links between randomly chosen but not yet linked players. While this dependence
exhibits a saturating outlay with a local maximum at τ = 70, the cooperation promoting
mechanism remains intact also for substantially larger τ across the whole span of b. The
optimum emerges as a result of the fully developed multilevel selection, which is not
attainable for small values of τ because too frequent additions of new links hinder the
formation of isolated homogeneous groups and yield mean-field type conditions. On the
other hand, as additions of new links become rare (τ is increased), the saturating effect
of cooperation promotion sets in due to the emergence of prolonged delays between
periods of active multilevel selection, during which defectors may be able to invade and
overtake individual cooperative groups. Our work demonstrates that simple strategy
independent coevolutionary rules may spontaneously evoke dynamical mechanisms that
affect the adoption of strategies on the macroscopic level of evolutionary game dynamics.
This presently manifests as multilevel selection that strongly promotes cooperation in
the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Slovenian Research Agency (grant Z1-2032-2547), the
Hungarian National Research Fund (grant K-73449), the Bolyai Research Scholarship,
and the Slovene-Hungarian bilateral incentive (grant BI-HU/09-10-001). Discussions
with Gyo¨rgy Szabo´ are gratefully acknowledged.
References
[1] Macy M W and Flache A 2002 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 99 7229
[2] Axelrod R 1984 The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books)
[3] Maynard Smith J 1982 Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambrdige: Cambridge University
Press)
Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner’s dilemma game on coevolving... 11
[4] Hofbauer J and Sigmund K 1988 Evolutionnary Games and Population Dynamics Cambrdige:
Cambridge University Press)
[5] Nowak M A and May R M 1992 Nature 359 826
[6] Hamilton W D 1964 J. Theor. Biol. 7 1
[7] Axelrod R and Hamilton W D 1981 Science 211 1390
[8] Fehr E and Ga¨chter S 2002 Nature 415 137
[9] Maynard Smith J 1964 Nature 201 1145
[10] Wilson D S 1977 Am. Nat. 111 157
[11] Wilson D S 1983 Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 14 159
[12] Traulsen A and Nowak M A 2006 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 103 10952
[13] Traulsen A, Shoresh N and Nowak M A 2008 Bull. Math. Biol. 70 1410
[14] Nowak M A 2006 Science 314 1560
[15] Wilson D S and Sober E 1998 Behav. Brain Sci. 21 305
[16] West S A, Griffin A S and Gardner A 2008 J. Evol. Biol. 21 374
[17] Abramson G and Kuperman M 2001 Phys. Rev. E 63 030901(R)
[18] Szabo´ G and Fa´th G 2007 Phys. Rep. 446 97
[19] Santos F C and Pacheco J M 2005 Phys. Rev. Lett. 95 098104
[20] Ohtsuki H, Nowak M A and Pacheco J M 2007 Phys. Rev. Lett. 98 108106
[21] Masuda N 2007 Proc. R. Soc. B 274 1815
[22] Pusch A, Weber S and Porto M 2008 Phys. Rev. E 77 036120
[23] Assenza S, Go´mez-Garden˜es J and Latora V 2008 Phys. Rev. E 78 017101
[24] Rong Z, Li X and Wang X 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 027101
[25] Kuperman M N and Risau-Gusman S 2008 Eur. Phys. J. B 62 233
[26] Perc M and Szolnoki A 2008 Phys. Rev. E 77 011904
[27] Santos F C, Santos M D and Pacheco J M 2008 Nature 454 213
[28] Wu Z-X and Holme P 2009 Phys. Rev. E 80 026108
[29] Du W-B, Cao X-B, Zhao L and Hu M-B 2009 Physica A 388 4509
[30] Fu F, Wu T and Wang L 2009 Phys. Rev. E 79 036101
[31] Yang D-P, Lin H, Wu C-X and Shuai J W 2009 New J. Phys. 11 073048
[32] Ebel H and Bornholdt S 2002 Phys. Rev. E 66 056118
[33] Zimmermann M G, Egu´ıluz V M and San Miguel M 2004 Phys. Rev. E 69 065102(R)
[34] Pacheco J M, Traulsen A and Nowak M A 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 97 258103
[35] Santos F C, Pacheco J M and Lenaerts T 2006 PLoS Comp. Biol. 2 e140
[36] Li W, Zhang X and Hu G 2007 Phys. Rev. E 76 045102(R)
[37] Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Flor´ıa L M, Sa´nchez A and Moreno Y 2008 PLoS ONE 3 e2449
[38] Szolnoki A, Perc M and Danku Z 2008 Europhys. Lett. 84 50007
[39] Poncela J, Go´mez-Garden˜es J, Traulsen A and Moreno Y 2009 New J. Phys. 11 083031
[40] van Segbroeck S, Santos F C, Nowe´ A, Pacheco J M and Lenaerts T 2008 BMC Evol. Biol. 8 287
[41] van Segbroeck S, Santos F C, Lenaerts T and Pacheco J M 2009 Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 058105
[42] Fu F, Hauert C, Nowak M A and Wang L 2008 Phys. Rev. E 78 026117
[43] Szolnoki A and Perc M 2008 New J. Phys. 10 043036
[44] Szolnoki A and Perc M 2009 Eur. Phys. J. B 67 337
[45] Baraba´si A L and Albert R 1999 Science 286 509
[46] Albert R and Baraba´si A L 2002 Rev. Mod. Phys. 74 47
[47] Albert R, Jeong H and Baraba´si A L 2000 Nature 406 378
[48] Cohen R, Erez K, ben-Avraham D and Havlin S 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 4626
[49] Callaway D S, Newman M E J, Strogatz S H and Watts D J 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 5468
[50] Cohen R, Erez K, ben-Avraham D and Havlin S 2001 Phys. Rev. Lett. 86 3682
[51] Pastor-Satorras R and Vespignani A 2002 Phys. Rev. E 65 036104
[52] Zanette D H and Kuperman M 2002 Physica A 309 445
[53] Barthe´lemy M, Barrat A, Pastor-Satorras R and Vespignani A 2004 Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 178701
Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner’s dilemma game on coevolving... 12
[54] Cohen R, Havlin S and ben-Avraham D 2003 Phys. Rev. Lett. 91 247901
[55] Perc M 2009 New J. Phys. 11 033027
[56] Holme P and Ghoshal G 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 96 098701
[57] Gross T, Dommar D’Lima C J and Blasius B 2006 Phys. Rev. Lett. 96 208701
[58] Dommar C J, Ryabov A and Blasius B 2008 Eur. Phys. J. Special Topics 157 223
[59] Gross T and Blasius B 2008 J. R. Soc. Interface 5 259
[60] Helbing D 1998 in Game Theory, Experience, Rationality (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic)
[61] Wu Z-X, Guan J-Y, Xu X-J, Wang Y-H 2007 Physica A 379 672
[62] Szabo´ G and To˝ke C 1998 Phys. Rev. E 58 69
[63] Wild G and Traulsen A 2007 J. Theor. Biol. 247 382
[64] Altrock P M and Traulsen A 2009 New J. Phys. 11 013012
[65] Dura´n O and Mulet R 2005 Physica D 208 257
